s

[연준와처] 6월1일 발표된 연준 대차대조표에 어떤 내용이 담겨 있나?

  •  양영빈 기자
  •  승인 2023.06.05 15:22

긴급 유동성공급으로 대차대조표 4000억달러 확대
연준 자산 은행위기 직전 수준까지 떨어져
5월 31일 국채 6240억달러, MBS 1490억달러 감소
브리지뱅크론 줄고 있어 은행위기 수그러지는 중
지급준비금 감소+ON RRP 감소+TGA 증가 예상돼

[이코노미21 양영빈] 6 1(현지시간) 연준의 대차대조표가 발표됐다. 3월초에 있었던 은행위기가 연준 대차대조표에 미쳤던 영향과  이후 대차대조표의 변화를 보면서 현재 상태를 점검해 보자.  

대차대조표 전체 크기

연준은 은행위기가 시스템 전체로 확대되는 것을 막기 위해 긴급 유동성 공급을 했고  결과 연준의 대차대조표는 4000억달러 가깝게 확대됐다. 2022 6 이후 연준이 매달 실시하는 양적긴축 규모는 대략 750~800억달러 수준이므로 2주만에 공급된 긴급 유동성은 5개월치의 양적긴축에 해당한다.

아래는 연준 대차대조표의 전체 크기(총자산) 추이를 보여준다.

출처=연준(fred.stlouisfed.org/graph/?g=15JDY)

연준의 자산이 은행위기 직전 수준까지 떨어졌음을   있다. 연준의 대차대조표 크기가 감소한 것은 첫째, 양적긴축에 의한 것이고 둘째, 은행위기 당시 공급했던 긴급 유동성 회수가 있다.

양적긴축 효과

연준은 기존의 계획대로 꾸준하게 양적긴축을 하고 있다. 연준의 양적긴축은 연준이 보유한 국채, MBS 감소시키는 방식으로 이루어 진다. 연준은 국채, MBS 보유한 계정을 따로 관리하는데 이것을 SOMA(System Open Market Account) 계정이라고 부른다. 또한 연준은 만기가 도래한 국채, MBS 롤오버하지 않고 그대로 만기 정산을 받는 방식으로 양적긴축을 진행한다.

2022 6 양적긴축을 시작한 이래 연준의 SOMA 계정에서 국채와 MBS 보유 추이를 보면 다음과 같다.

5 31일까지 국채는 6240억달러, MBS 1490억달러가 감소했다. 국채와 MBS 월별 감소 추이를 보면 다음과 같다.

국채의 감소 목표 최대치인 600억달러는  지켜지고 있고 MBS 최대 목표치가 350억달러지만 보통 150~200억달러 정도로 줄어들고 있다. MBS 감소 최대 목표치에  미치는 것은 연준은 여전히 수동적(passive) 양적긴축을 하기 때문이다.

미국의 가계가 대출한 모기지는 금리가 매우 낮을  계약한 고정금리 모기지라서 지금처럼 고금리 시기에는 가계가 기존의 모기지를 새로운 모기지로 갈아탈 이유가 없다. 연준이 모기지(MBS) 감축 목표를 350억달러로 설정한 것은 과거 경험으로 예상한 기존의 모기지에서 새로운 모기지로 옮기는 것을 고려한 수치이다.

그러나 급격한 금리 상승으로 인해 기존이 모기지를 그대로 유지하려는 경향이 매우 높기 때문에 연준은 만기가 도래하는 모기지(MBS) 대차대조표에서 덜어내고 있다.

긴급 유동성 추이

은행위기가 시스템 전체로 확대되는 것을 사전에 방지하기 위해 연준은 짧은 시간 동안 4000억달러에 달하는 긴급 유동성을 지원했다. 긴급 유동성에는 전통적인 재할인 창구, BTFP, 해외 금융기관을 위한 FIMA Repo, 그리고 파산한 은행을 인수하는데 필요한 브리지뱅크 론이 있다.

다음은 네가지 긴급 유동성 지원의 추이를 보여준다.

출처=연준(fred.stlouisfed.org/graph/?g=15JF6)

긴급유동성 지원이 한창이었을 때는 4037억달러에 달했고 5 31일에는 2857억달러로 감소했다. 전체적으로 고점대비 1180억달러가 감소했다. 해외 금융기관에 지원한 FIMA Repo 재할인 창구를 통해 지원한 것은 현재는 거의 0 가깝다.

재할인 창구와 성격은 같지만 조건이 다른 BTFP 여전히 늘어나고 있다. BTFP 늘어나 가장  이유는 재할인 창구에 비해 조건이 훨씬 좋기 때문이다. 같은 담보물을 제공해도 받을  있는 자금이 많고 금리도 싸기 때문이다. 6 1 기준으로 재할인창구(Primary Credit) 금리는 5.25%이고 BTFP 금리는 5.15%이다.

출처=연준재할인창구(https://www.frbdiscountwindow.org/)

문제가  은행의 인수절차를 위해 공급한 브리지뱅크론이 더디긴 하지만 줄어들고 있어 은행위기는 점차 수그러지고 있는 것으로 보인다.

마지막으로 재무부가 연준에 보유한 재무부일반계정의 잔고는 다음과 같다.

현재 TGA 잔고는 485억달러로 최저 수준에 있다. 다행히도 부채한도 협상이 최종적으로 상원을 통과해 다음 주부터는 단기적으로 TGA 급격한 증가와 지급준비금의 감소를 예상할  있다.

지급준비금의 증감은 연준의 대차대조표와 관계가 있는 주체들인 은행, MMF 행동방식과 밀접한 관계가 있다. 부채한도 협상 타결 이후 대규모의 국채 발행이 예상된다.

은행에 자금을 예치한 민간이 추가로 발행된 국채를 매입하면 은행 예금을 인출해서 TGA 계좌로 송금하는 결과를 가져온다. 이런 경우에는 지급준비금 감소(예금인출로 인한 감소) TGA 증가 예상된다.  

그러나 대규모로 발행된 국채의 수익률이 ON RRP 수익률보다 높아지면 MMF ON RRP 자금을 인출해서 TGA계좌로 송금하게 된다. 이런 경우에는 ‘ON RRP 감소와 TGA 증가 나타나게 된다. 현재 1개월 국채의 수익률은 5.25%이고 ON RRP 수익률은 5.05%이므로 수익률 차이가 20bps이다.

따라서 종합적으로 보면 지급준비금 감소(민간의 국채매입)+ON RRP 감소(MMF 국채 매입)+TGA 증가 예상된다. [이코노미21]

 

Summary

  • 세수입 부재한 정부의 재정지출 확대로 국채발행 증가하며 장기금리 높게 유지될 것
    • 재정지출 확대 원인: 인구 노령화로 인한 복지 프로그램 지출, 지정학적 위기에 대한 미국 가버넌스 약화로 전쟁 지원금 확대, 탈세계화에 따른 공급망 재편 인센티브 제공 위해 정부 보조금 사용
  • 탈세계화에 따른 공급 감소 우려로 고금리 장기화 전망
  • 모기지 금리 증가로 거주 이전 인센티브 감소하며 노동 효율 감소

Higher Interest Rates Are Here to Stay. What It Means for the Economy.

Even as inflation eases, global changes including less trade and growing government deficits will keep rates higher than before.

As Federal Reserve officials head into their final policy meeting of the year, on Dec. 12-13, both Wall Street and Main Street are fixated on the outlook for interest rates. With inflation falling steadily, how soon—and how aggressively—will the U.S. central bank cut rates in the coming year?

 

 

The better question is where rates will settle in the coming decade. The probable answer: below today’s target range of 5.25%-5.50%, but higher than many economists and policy makers expected a year or two ago, and far higher than the near-zero rates of the past 15 years. The consequences will be profound, though not entirely detrimental, affecting the global economy, investment portfolios, and monetary and fiscal policy for years to come.

 

Expectations for the long-term trajectory of interest rates lie at the heart of a debate over the so-called neutral rate, or the interest rate at which the economy is in equilibrium, with monetary policy neither too tight nor too loose. A growing chorus of economists argues that structural shifts in the economy that were either introduced during or exacerbated by the Covid pandemic are pushing the neutral rate higher than it has been in decades.

Advertisement - Scroll to Continue

 

There are a handful of factors at play: Governments are spending more freely without raising taxes, pushing up deficits. Consumer demand has proved to be remarkably persistent. A slowdown in globalization has led to both a decline in trade volumes and a costly effort to bring supply chains closer to home, making consumer goods more expensive.

 

 

These changes, among others, have led to increased friction in the economy and will make it more prone to bouts of inflation moving forward, economists say, forcing monetary policy to run tighter as a result. Since 2019, Fed officials’ median forecast has put the longer-run federal-funds rate—effectively their estimate of neutral—at 2.5%. That equates to a 0.5% real neutral rate, after subtracting the Fed’s 2% inflation target.

 

 

Now, many economists believe that the federal-funds rate could settle in the mid3% range, or even as high as 4% over the longer term. Adjusted for inflation, that implies an anticipated real neutral rate of 1.5% to 2%—three or four times the level that officials were predicting a few years ago.

 

 

“That is a very different world from the world we left,” says Diane Swonk, chief economist with KPMG.

 


There is a catch. The neutral rate can’t be measured, and can be estimated only in hindsight. Yet gauging its level is paramount for Fed policy makers as they weigh whether and when to cut interest rates, and how best to minimize economic damage while cooling inflation further.

 

If officials assume that the neutral rate is higher than it really is, they risk overtightening monetary policy. If they assume it is lower, as some economists fear the Fed is doing, they risk tightening insufficiently, thereby allowing the economy to reflate within a matter of months. Taming resurgent inflation would require even more painful monetary tightening.

 

 

“Part of the reason why I think many of the projections, including those in the markets, for cutting rates overdo it a bit is because they presume that policy is more contractionary than it already is,” says former Treasury Secretary Larry Summers. “They assume too low a neutral rate.”

 

 

Expect the debate over “neutral” to dominate economic policy discussions in the coming months. But it will take on even greater importance thereafter, as economists and Fed officials attempt to map out what the economy might look like once price growth settles back to the Fed’s 2% annual target, and how it will compare with the pre-Covid era.

To be sure, a higher neutral rate isn’t a foregone conclusion. Opinions vary, and unexpected events, such as another financial crisis or pandemic, could force the Fed and other central banks to push rates much lower.

 

 

But for now, even Fed officials have begun to signal that they believe the neutral rate is rising. In the central bank’s quarterly projections released in March, only four officials wrote that they believed the neutral rate had climbed above 2.5%. By September, seven officials said the same. Officials will publish their latest projections on Dec. 13, at the close of the Federal Open Market Committee meeting.

 

 

The long-run implications of a higher neutral rate are substantial. Money would no longer be as cheap as it was for much of the 2010s. Debt would be more costly, and loans would be more difficult to secure. Start-up businesses would face heightened pressure to turn profits quickly, and fewer would get off the ground.

Advertisement - Scroll to Continue

 

But there would be benefits, too. Savers and retirees would profit from higher-yielding fixed-income investments. Higher rates would encourage more saving and more-efficient capital allocation. And central banks would have room to adjust rates lower in the event of an economic slowdown, which would make for a less volatile economy.

“This, in my mind, is the single best financial market development in the past 20 years,” says Joseph Davis, global chief economist at Vanguard. “And there’s nothing close.”

 

 

It wasn’t so long ago that economists and policy makers were focused on why wage and productivity growth were so sluggish, and whether inflation would ever climb back to the Fed’s annual 2% target growth level. Despite more than a decade of ultralow rates, core personal-consumption expenditures—the Fed’s preferred inflation gauge—topped 2% in only five months from 2010 to 2020.

 

 

The explanation that was growing in popularity before Covid hit was that the neutral rate must be lower than anyone had thought. Slowing productivity and an aging workforce appeared to be weighing down the economy in such a way that monetary policy would need to remain loose for price growth to return to target.

 

 

Ultralow inflation and ultralow interest rates were making for an unusual equilibrium. “It’s hard to get out of that cycle without a major shock,” says Kristin Forbes, an economics professor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

 

Then Covid arrived, upending the global economy. While the factors believed to be dragging down the neutral rate pre-Covid haven’t been eliminated, they have now been overshadowed by fresh changes that have left the economy more prone to global shocks and bouts of inflation. 

Advertisement - Scroll to Continue

 

“We went through the proverbial looking glass, into a mirror image of the world we left,” says Swonk.

 

 

Among the most influential changes has been the ballooning of government deficits, and the propensity of many Western governments to spend freely on policy initiatives without ensuring a commensurate increase in tax revenue to offset the costs. In the U.S., debt held by the public ballooned as a share of overall GDP from 79.4% in 2019 to 99.8% in 2020, and it’s projected to increase sharply in the coming decade. Data from the International Monetary Fund show that a number of European countries, including Germany and the United Kingdom, have seen similarly steep rises in recent years. 

 

 

This increased deficit spending is due partly to the post-financial-crisis embrace of quantitative easing by central banks, which gave governments a regular buyer for their debt, says Torsten Sløk, chief economist at Apollo Global Management.

The combination of reduced savings and increased spending will stimulate the economy, pushing up the neutral rate over time. And a number of new trends suggest that generous federal spending is poised to continue. Consider governments’ embrace of climate-change mitigation: The continuing green transition will require expensive investments to find alternative sources of energy, while the increased frequency of natural disasters and other weather events will require costly recovery efforts.

 

 

Aging populations, too, require elevated levels of government spending on healthcare and entitlement programs, which will be major contributors to the forecast rise in the U.S. deficit in coming decades, barring political changes. Likewise, rising geopolitical tension has necessitated an increase in military spending in high-income nations. The war in Ukraine pushed total global military expenditure up 3.7% in 2022, and European spending saw its largest year-over-year jump in at least 30 years, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute

 

 

Future totals could edge higher still: In the U.S., the proposed Department of Defense budget for fiscal-year 2024 came in 5% above the level that had been anticipated a year earlier, and the Congressional Budget Office forecasts that the agency’s overall costs will rise10% from 2028 to 2038.

Advertisement - Scroll to Continue

 

Heightened global tension is one result of a trend toward global fragmentation, which has led to a slowdown in worldwide trade and a renewed focus on building supply chains closer to home to minimize risk. Both shifts are likely to stoke inflation and weigh on growth. In a similar vein, an industrial-policy push for more domestic production of technology such as semiconductors has led to an increase in the use of government subsidies to incentivize investment in higher-wage nations.

 

 

In all, annual public expenditure in the U.S. could increase beginning next year by a level equivalent to 2% of gross domestic product, says Adam Posen, president of the Peterson Institute for International Economics. Other Group of Seven nations and China, he adds, are behind the U.S. but on a similar track.

 

 

“This is substantial,” Posen says. “And there is very little prospect in the near term for raising taxes.”

There is no telling yet whether any of these shifts will become permanent. But their impact has already been greater and more persistent than initially expected, a point that European Central Bank President Christine Lagarde made in a speech at the Fed’s Jackson Hole economic policy symposium in August.

 

 

That could have significant implications for the Fed’s inflation fight, where progress in reducing core inflation from a current annual rate of 3.5% down to 2% could prove slow. More important, it could also affect where price growth and the neutral rate settle in the future.

 

 

Says Summers: “2% is looking more and more like a floor on inflation, rather than an average inflation rate over time.”

 

Even assuming the neutral rate has risen, there is disagreement about what this will mean for the economy and whether it will help or harm business owners, consumers, and investors.

 

One concern is that higher rates could throw sand in the gears of the housing market by exacerbating affordability problems. In the U.S. especially, where many homeowners locked in 30-year mortgages in recent years at rates below 4%, there is an incentive to stay put rather than move, given how much more expensive the next loan would be. As a result, prospective home buyers are facing not only higher mortgage rates but also less housing supply, since fewer existing homes are coming on the market than in the past.

 

 

Advertisement - Scroll to Continue

 

One ripple effect could be a less efficient labor market, says MIT’s Forbes. Mobility has long been a hallmark of the U.S. economy, helping to support wage growth by allowing workers to move to take a more lucrative position. 

“If you’re constrained because you don’t want to sell your house,” Forbes says, that can “take away some of the bargaining power of workers.” 

 

 

The shift to a higher-rate regime over the long term will also tax millions of companies launched in the past 15 years, which have never known anything other than the easy-money policies that have prevailed since early 2009. That could lead to at least a brief increase in bankruptcy filings as the corporate sector adjusts to paying more to borrow money. 

It could become more difficult for firms to get off the ground, too. For much of the past decade, entrepreneurs could borrow capital at little cost, allowing them to keep their doors open for years without turning a profit. “Now, you need to have a business that actually makes money, and makes money sooner, because the discount rate goes up,” Sløk says.

When debt costs more in a higher-rate world, there is less money available for otherwise fruitful investment, a shift that will be felt particularly in the public sector. U.S. interest costs nearly doubled from 2020 to 2023 and are the fastest-growing area of government spending, says the Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget. The U.S. is on track to spend more than $13 trillion on interest costs over the next decade, the committee projects.

Given that growth, the average citizen will get less value from the government, Posen says.

Advertisement - Scroll to Continue

 

“To make it sound very bloodless,” he continues, “there is a robust empirical relationship across countries over time that if you have higher government interest payments as a share of GDP crowding out private-sector and public-sector investment, you have low innovation, a low rate of productivity growth, a low rate of growth overall.”

 

 

That said, the transition away from easy money has benefits, too, even if the positives are more often overlooked.

Although a higher cost of capital means that loans might be harder to come by, the best ideas will still find funding. And better capital allocation means funding will go to innovations, technologies, or projects that are best poised to take off. That could lead to better economic results, says James Bullard, the former president of the St. Louis Fed.

 

 

“I love innovation as much as the next person, but it shouldn’t just be willy-nilly,” says Bullard, now the dean of the business school at Purdue University. “You may have better discipline if you have somewhat higher real rates.”

For investors, the benefits can be even more tangible. Savers will be rewarded as cash compounds, allowing for higher returns. That is particularly beneficial to older Americans, including many retirees, who tend toward more conservative fixed-income investments.

 

 

“You’re seeing a tidal wave of change in how people think about [getting] income into portfolios,” says Rick Rieder, chief investment officer of global fixed income at BlackRock. “You can now build a portfolio to get 6%, 6.5%, 7% yield using quality fixed-income assets.”

 

 

Even those who regard higher rates as a plus for both the economy and investors recognize that there will probably have to be a painful transition period before we settle into the next equilibrium. While the economy has handled the jump from near-zero interest rates to the current level remarkably well, due in part to sustained fiscal spending, signs of a slowdown have emerged recently. Those are likely to become more noticeable in the coming months as the restrictive regime takes hold more fully and so-called zombie firms propped up by stimulus spending and low rates start to collapse.

Then, the benefits will come. 

 

 

Vanguard’s Davis pictures a bell curve when thinking about growth under various interest-rate levels. Exceedingly high rates such as those seen during former Fed Chair Paul Volcker’s era in the 1980s stifle growth. But near-zero rates can promote a sluggish environment, too, he says. While they might stimulate asset prices in the short term, long-term returns fall because there is no base rate to compound. 

Settling somewhere in the middle brings the most benefit, notwithstanding any interim pain. “There is a transition here,” he says. “But I would take that transition any day.”

Write to Megan Cassella at megan.cassella@dowjones.com

물가 상승 해소 국면이나 이는 소비 및 투자 영역 경기 악화에 기인

- 지속적인 부채 증가에 따른 소비 감소, 투자 감소는 GDP 감소 요인

 

중국, 부동산 의존 커 부동산 시장 악화에 따라 투자 뿐만 아니라 관련 종사자의 수입 악화로 소비 감소로도 연결

- 부동산 向 투자를 신재생 에너지 및 제조업으로 전환 중이나 성과 미미

+ Recent posts